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INTRODUCTION

With the advent of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)1 in 1993, the drive toward market liberalization
in the Americas took on a new character. Western Hemisphere
efforts at intraregional free trade never before included nations
of such widely disparate levels of development and, at the same
time, laid claim to enforceability as treaty-law. 2 Although nominally a "free trade agreement," 3 the NAFTA contains a chapter
devoted to investment. This chapter, Chapter Eleven, contains
some of the treaty's most reformative provisions, which make the
liberalization of restrictions on investment of perhaps equal moment as that of restrictions on trade in goods. 4 It is an open
question whether Chapter Eleven will serve as the archetypal
investment regime for the still unfolding Free Trade Area of the
Americas (FTAA).5
1. The North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32
LL.M. 296 and 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
2. Kenneth W. Abbott & Gregory W. Bowman, Economic Integration in the Americas: "A Work in Progress," 14 NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 493, 496 (1994) (noting that the
NAFTA is "the first major free trade agreement between developed and developing countries"); ALAN C. SWAN & JOHN MURPHY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE REGULATION OF
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS 51 (Supp. 1995) [hereinafter SWAN
& MURPHY (Supp. 95)].
3. GARY C. HUFBAUER & JEFFREY J. SCHOTT, WESTERN HEMISPHERE ECONOMIC
INTEGRATION 3 (1994) (noting that in free trade agreements, "[tihe focus is on trade liberalization").
4. Hope H. Camp, Jr. & Andrius R. Kontrimas, Direct Investment Issues, in
NAFTA AND BEYOND 87, 89 (Joseph J. Norton & Thomas L. Bloodworth eds., 1995)
(introducing the NAFTA's provisions on direct investment as "one of [its] primary pillars").
5. The three suggested approaches to the formation of the FTAA are: 1) NAFTAbased accession; 2) convergence of existing subregional agreements or "bloc accession;"
and 3) multilateral agreements. For a discussion of the NAFTA-based approach, see
Paul A. O'Hop, HemisphericIntegration and the Elimination of Legal Obstacles Under a
NAFTA-Based System, 33 HARV. INT'L L.J. 27, 128 (1995) (noting that "[tihe expectations
of many Latin American states (as manifested by their push for NAFTA membership)
combined with the economic dominance of the NAFTA states strongly supports the notion that, at least in the more immediate future, NAFTA is the logical centerpiece of such
a system"); Jeffrey J. Schott & Gary C. Hufbauer, Free Trade Areas, the Enterprise for
the Americas Initiative,and the Multilateral Trading System, in STRATEGIC OPTIONS FOR
LATIN AMERICA IN THE 1990s at 249 (Colin Bradford ed., 1992). For a discussion of bloc
accession, see Frank J. Garcia, NAFTA and the Creation of the FTAA A Critique of
Piecemeal Accession, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 539 (1995); Ana Maria de Aguinis, Can
MERCOSUR Accede to NAFTA? A Legal Perspective, 10 CONN. J. INT'L L. 597, 638
(1995) ("From the Summit of the Americas and the political spirit of the democratic
states to create a Free Trade Area of the Americas by 2005, we must find the common
bases between all the subregional integration schemes existing in America, while still
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While eliminating restrictions on investment capital market
access may not be at the forefront of regional economic integration, reducing these restrictions may be as essential to successful
liberalization as lowering barriers to goods. 6 The free flow of investment capital achievable through the liberalization of capital
market access restrictions both facilitates and builds upon free
trade in goods and services. Although most of the prospective
FTAA partners demonstrated a binding commitment to free
trade upon becoming parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO),
many of their current foreign investment laws are not yet on par
with NAFTA standards. The reformatory Mexican openness to
direct and portfolio investment embodied in the NAFTA may be
less readily replicated by other regional trading partners. If a
repeat of the bargain made with Mexico on investment measures
is expected, the capital market access issue could hinder the
7
formation of FTAA by the scheduled 2005 deadline.
Because NAFTA's Chapter Eleven represents the neoliberal
ideal of FTAA investment provisions, this Comment analyzes the
scope of the NAFTA investment provisions, inquires into the
broader scheme of investment law liberalization in Latin America, and then assesses the prospects for regional deregulation of
restrictions on capital movements along NAFTA lines. To place
the reform in perspective, Part II contrasts the inward-looking
economic orientation of the past with the openness evident today
keeping very mindful that the points to negotiate are very closely intertwined with the
objectives of NAFTA."). For commentary on the multilateral agreement approach, see
Estrella Gutierrez, The Third Route to the FTAA, Inter Press Service, Mar. 15, 1996,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File; Richard Bernal, Regional Trade Arrangements in the Western Hemisphere, 8 AM. U. J. INVL L. & POL'Y 683, 712 (1993); Ab-

bott & Bowman, supra note 2 (suggesting an approach along the lines of the Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation organization (APEC)).
6. Daniel M. Price, An Overview of the NAFTA Investment Chapter: Substantive
Rules and Investor-StateDispute Settlement, 27 INT'L LAW. 727 (1993).

7. The Summit of the Americas Declaration of Principles' language reads:
We, therefore, resolve to begin immediately to construct the "Free Trade

Area of the Americas" (FTAA), in which barriers to trade and investment will
be progressively eliminated. We further resolve to conclude the negotiation
of the "Free Trade Area of the Americas" no later than 2005, and agree that
concrete progress toward the attainment of this objective will be made by the
end of this century .... We will build on existing subregional and bilateral

agreements in order to broaden and deepen hemispheric economic integration and to bring the agreements together.

Summit of the Americas: Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action, Dec. 11, 1994, 34
I.L.M. 808,811 (1995) [hereinafter Summit Declaration].
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and notes that the transition to free-market policies may not be
complete in the area of foreign investment law. In addition, Part
II introduces several rationales for the trend toward liberalization of investment law and discusses various forms of capital
controls and market access restrictions that work counter to this
trend. Emphasizing the remarkably reformative nature of the
NAFTA upon Mexican law's treatment of foreign investment,
Part III assesses the scope of the NAFTA's Chapter Eleven and
related Annexes. Part IV then expresses a concern for the sustainability of the market reform by noting that adherence to
neoliberal reform could be overshadowed by the potential for
policymaking failures attributable to economic populism.
This Comment concludes that the progress in the Americas
toward the liberalization of laws controlling the movement of investment capital provides grounds for optimism with respect to
the adoption of a Chapter Eleven equivalent. Tempering this
optimism is a potential shortfall in the sort of institutional reform which is necessary to support a free-market orientation.
The Summit of the Americas Declaration of Principles recognizes
that overcoming this shortfall is a condition precedent for a mutually prosperous and lasting integration.8 Without debating the
ultimate content of any FTAA investment provision or the merits
of neoliberal economic reform, this Comment aims merely to
promote the idea that supporting institutional reform may be
necessary for the sustainability of investment law liberalization
in the Americas. 9

II. PAST AND PRESENT POLICY STANCES TOWARD FOREIGN
INVESTMENT IN LATIN AMERICA

Whether the proposed FTAA will proceed precisely along the
8. The Declaration of Principles of the Summit of the Americas states:
We recognize that economic integration and the creation of a free trade area
will be complex endeavors, particularly in view of the wide differences in the
levels of development and size of economies existing in our Hemisphere. We
will remain cognizant of these differences as we work toward economic integration in the Hemisphere. We look to our own resources, ingenuity, and
individual capacities as well as the international community to help us
achieve our goals.
Id.
9. In this context, the term "sustainability" is frequently used to denote a perceived need for the delicate sequencing of economic reform in light of its potentially destabilizing ramifications.
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lines of the NAFTA and contain the truly revolutionary reform
represented by Chapter Eleven of the NAFTA or whether a less
ambitious adaptation will be devised emerges as a critical yet
unresolved issue. 10 While market reform and intraregional economic agreement have proceeded at an increased pace in recent
years, questioning the inevitability of the progress along similar
lines without rebound is worthwhile given Latin America's legacy of nationalism and inward-oriented economic policy. Asking
whether this policy reversal can be accomplished in a short time
and with permanency calls for an assessment of the depth of the
most recent historical shift to neoliberalism from nationalism
and the protectionist dependency theory. 1
A.

Economic Nationalism

While the postindependence history of Latin America reveals
a pattern of oscillations between economic nationalism and liberalism,' 2 this Comment addresses the latest and perhaps most
dramatic shift from nationalism to neoliberalism. In the late
1950s, many Latin American nations sought to better their position in the global economy by joining together in a nationalistic
move away from economic liberalism and its tenets of freemarkets.' 3 The perception of Latin America's traditional role in
the global economy as an exporter of raw materials led to the
powerful "dependency theory."'14 Raul Prebisch used the term
"center-periphery" to characterize the Northern industrialized
nations' relationship with the underdeveloped, nonindustrialized

10. Recognition of market reform as a laudable goal is reflected by the Summit
principle" that "[a] key to prosperity is trade without barriers, without subsidies, without unfair practices, and with an increasing stream of productive investments." Summit
Declaration supra note 7, at 811.

11. See generally Florencia E. Mallon, Economic Liberalism.- Where We Are and
Where We Need to Go, in GUIDING THE INVISIBLE HAND: ECONOMIC LIBERALISM AND THE
STATE IN LATIN AMERICAN HISTORY 177-86 (Joseph L. Love & Nils Jacobsen eds., 1988).
12. Amy L. Chua, The Privatization-NationalizationCycle: The Link Between Markets and Ethnicity in Developing Countries, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 226-43 (1995).
13. Bernal supranote 5, at 699.

14. "Dependency theory" posits that the developed and industrial Northern economies sought to forever relegate the less-developed Southern economies to a position of
dependency upon their industrial goods rather than to permit the South to develop on its
own and become independent. A widely known study of dependency theory can be found
in FERNANDO H. CARDOSO & ENZO FALETTO, DEPENDENCY AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN
AMERICA (1979).
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South as exploitative. 15 Prebisch's theory influenced the United
16
Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA),
which brought the center-periphery theory to international attention. 17 Following the second meeting of the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development in 1968, the Generalized
System of Preferences, a preferential trading system based on
unilateral grants of tariff reductions by the developed countries
8
Developing
to their developing counterparts, was established.'
countries maintained high tariff barriers to industrialized goods
as part of the strategy of import-substitution which sought to
replace imported industrial goods with homegrown goods by protecting "infant industries" normally deprived of the opportunity
for growth in the face of developed world competition.
19
With regard to the treatment of direct foreign investment
during the 1950s, the nationalism that spread throughout the
region resulted in the expropriation and nationalization of many
large foreign holdings in economic sectors considered crucial to
state welfare. State contracts and concession agreements by
which the host government secured large amounts of direct foreign investment by granting a foreign investor the rights to tap a
natural resource or manage an important domestic export crop
were renegotiated. The focus was on changing terms highly unfavorable to the host government or terminating the agreement
20
The
completely to allow state management of the activity.
transition from privately run industries controlled by foreign investors to state-run industries forcibly reduced the levels of foreign investment in Latin America.
The use of exchange controls on both the current and capital
accounts to halt the flow of convertible currency abroad contributed to the debt crisis that began in the early 1980s.21 While focused on stemming the flow of capital abroad either in satisfac15. Luis Eugenio di Marco, The Evolution of Prebisch's Economic Thought, in
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS AND DEVELOPMENT: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF RA(JL PREBISCH 3, 4

(Luis Eugenio di Marco ed., 1972).
16. The Commission's name is presently the "Economic Commission for Latin
America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)."
17. JOS2 CAYUELA, ECLAC: 40 YEARS (1948-1988) 24, 25 (1988).
18. ALAN C. SWAN & JOHN F. MURPHY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE REGULATION
OF INTERNATIONAL BusiNEss AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS 332-33 (1991).

19. For definitions of direct and portfolio investment, see discussion infra Part II.C.
20. SWAN & MURPHY, supra note 18, at 728.
21. See ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEMS 279-391

(1984).
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tion of foreign debt or in flight to safer territory, the exchange
controls worked to stop repatriation of profits from the remaining direct foreign investment as well as repatriation of the underlying capital investment. With the last significant U.S. case
concerning the extraterritorial application of foreign exchange
controls to bar transfer of capital dating to 1985,22 hostility toward the free outward movement of foreign capital is not yet in
the distant past.
B.

Liberalizationof Regimes Governing Flows of
Investment Capital

Behind the move toward liberalization is a combination of
interrelated historical and theoretical explanations. Historical
explanations are the spread of democracy in the post-Cold War
world, advances in technology and telecommunications, and the
move from fixed to floating exchange rates over the past quarter
century. 23 An additional historical explanation particular to
Latin America is the need to reverse the region's recent "decapitalization through capital flight and heavy debt-servicing" 24
and to regain economies of scale lost as a result of inward orientation. Theoretical explanation can be found in international
trade theory and the models of comparative advantage which
posit trade as welfare-enhancing. 25 In a similar vein, neoliberal
economic theory claims that efficient resource allocation can be
furthered in markets free of distorting access restrictions. 26 The
vertical integration model of enterprise organization and its emphasis on internalization can also be seen to play a role in the

22. Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Crddito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir.
1985).

23. Edward W. Kelley, Jr., Address at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Conference (Mar. 19, 1994) available in LEXIS, Bankng Library, Fedsp File. For a thoughtful
interpretation of the new international context of development, see Barbara Stallings,
Introduction. Global Change, Regional Response, in GLOBAL CHANGE, REGIONAL RESPONSE (Barbara Stallings ed., 1995) (discussing the end of the Cold War, rivalry among
capitalist powers, the globalization of production and trade, the change in direction and
composition of capital flows, and changes in ideology as important factors).
24. Bernal, supra note 5, at 694.
25. PETER DICKEN, GLOBAL SHIFT: THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 91 (1992).
26. Joseph L. Love & Nits Jacobsen, Preface to GUIDING THE INVISIBLE HAND:
ECONOMIC LIBERALISM IN LATIN AMERICA, at vii (Joseph L. Love & Nils Jacobsen eds.,

1988).
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move toward the "internationalization" of production and thus
provide an opportunity for countries to capitalize on marketoriented reform. 27 The impetus for liberalization of foreign investment laws presently pervading Latin America thus derives
from a mixture of these reasons.
With regard to liberalization of restrictions on direct foreign
investment, the process of privatization is perhaps the most remarkable development. Privatization entails the sale, lease or
licensing of state-run enterprises to private investors. 28 In recent years, state industries in Latin America from airlines and
railroads to oil companies and telecommunication providers have
been "put on the auction block." Privatization raises investment
capital in either portfolio or direct investment form, depending
on the technique of privatization. In addition, it plays a role in
broadening the sectoral extent of foreign investment. Some,
however, do not consider the move a deeply rooted phenomenon
and identify a "privatization-nationalization cycle" in developing
countries deriving from the "explosive role" of nationalism in developing countries.2 9 While privatization represents a highly reformatory step toward a market economy, its permanence has
been called into question.
C. Capital Controls and Other Market Access
Restrictions:Measures Designed to Slow the
Pace of Investment Capital
Investment capital flows can take the form of either direct
investment, which entails a degree of control and participation in
the decision-making of the recipient enterprise, or portfolio investment which, in contrast, amounts to passive investment in
assets like stocks or bonds. Because of the historical and developmental importance of direct foreign investment, this Comment
focuses on the restrictions imposed on it by host nations.30

27. Martin Shapiro, The Globalization of Law, 1 GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. J. 37, 39
(1993); Alan C. Swan, Book Review, 90 AM. J. IN'VL L. 348, 349 (1996). Through inter-

nalization, firms seek to perform production and supply functions themselves rather than
procuring components through trade when doing so is economically prudent.
28. Carlos E. Martinez, Early Lessons of Latin American Privatizations, 15
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 468, 492 (1992).

29. Chua, supra note 12, at 226.
30. See discussion supraPart II.A.
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The imposition of capital controls limits the admission and
repatriation of either profits or capital or both. Restrictions on
capital flows may be direct, taking the form of quantitative restrictions on the amount of capital that can move either in or out
of an economy, or indirect, taking the form of taxes on crossborder movements, minimum stay periods for capital, licensing
requirements, and sectoral exemptions. 3 ' Differential treatment
of investment on the basis of foreign or domestic "nationality" is
also frequent.3 2 Four current rationales for capital controls were
set forth in a recent IMF publication: 1) to limit volatile shortterm capital flows; 2) to transform developing countries' domestic savings into domestic investment; 3) to strengthen domestic
ability to tax; and 4) to sustain stabilization and structural reform.33 This Comment emphasizes controls which affect market

access and the admission of direct foreign investment as well as
the applicability of these controls to nationals and foreigners
alike, known as "national treatment," or to foreign investors
alone.
III. CHAPTER ELEVEN OF THE NAFTA AS THE ARCHETYPAL
INVESTMENT LAw REGIME FOR THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE?
As an accompaniment to the trade liberalization that has
spanned the globe since the inception of the GATT, 34 reform of
laws restricting inward investment has occurred, but on a less
consistent basis. This may be attributable in part to the lack of
international consensus and the corresponding absence of an international institutional framework governing investment
flows.3 5 Partially filling this regulatory void, the NAFTA repre31. For further discussion of capital controls, see DONALD J. MATHIESON & LILIANA
ROJAS-SUAREz, LIBERALIZATION OF THE CAPITAL ACCOUNT: EXPERIENCES AND ISSUES

(1993); Vittorio Grilli & Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti, Economic Effects and Structural Determinants of CapitalControls, 42 IMF Staff Paper 517 (Sept. 1995). For a discussion of
policy concerns surrounding capital flows, see Robert Devlin et al., Surges in Capital
Flows and Development: An Overview of Policy Issues, in COPING WITH CAPITAL SURGES:
THE RETURN OF FINANCE TO LATIN AMERICA 225-60 (Ricardo Ffrench-Davis & Stephany

Griffith-Jones eds., 1995).
32. For a discussion of "national treatment," see infra Part III.
33. MATHIESON & ROJAS-SUAREZ, supra note 31, at 1.
34. Since the Uruguay Negotiating Round and conclusion of the World Trade Organization Charter, the reformed GATT now bears the name 'The World Trade Organization (WTO)." SWAN & MURPHY (Supp. 95), supra note 2, at 16.
35. While there is no counterpart to the WTO regarding direct foreign investment,
some international guidelines and multilateral efforts have developed. See discussion
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sents a trilateral commitment encompassing not only the North
American free trade pledges, 3 6 but also standards for the treatment, transfer, expropriation, and settlement of investor-state
disputes.37 While the NAFTA's inclusion of such investor protection standards is not revolutionary 8 the scope of the protection is substantial. Furthermore, the treaty's preservation of
liberalization through the "juridification" of market reform
makes its commitments relatively immutable when compared
39
with both the Southern Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR)
and the European Union's more flexible institutional framework.4° When placed in historical perspective, the Chapter
Eleven provisions represent a dramatic shift under Mexican law
toward the free movement of investment capital. 4 1 Whether
Chapter Eleven of the NAFTA will serve as the archetypal regime for direct foreign investment throughout the Western
Hemisphere has yet to be formally resolved.
The NAFTA investment chapter's objective is "to increase
substantially investment opportunities." 42 The reform encompasses four basic areas of concern for the holder of direct foreign
investment abroad: 1) legal standards for the treatment accorded
the investment; 2) transfer rights and capital market access restrictions; 3) guidelines for expropriation compensation; and 4)
infra note 109.
36. See generally NAFTA, supra note 1, chs. 2-4.
37. See generally id. ch. 11.

38. The U.S. bilateral investment treaty program generally covers these four areas
of investor concern. For discussion of this program, see Kenneth J. Vandevelde, U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaties: The Second Wave, 14 MICH. J. INVL L. 621 (1994); Paul
Comeaux & Stephen Kinsella, Reducing PoliticalRisk in Developing Countries: Bilateral
Investment Treaties, Stabilization Clauses, and MIGA & OPIC Investment Insurance, 15
N.Y. L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1 (1994).

39. MERCOSUR, the Southern Cone Common Market or "Mercado Comtin del Cono
Sur," was established by the Asunci6n Treaty in 1991.

Treaty Establishing a Common

Market between the Argentine Republic, the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Republic
of Paraguay and the Eastern Republic of Uruguay, Mar. 26, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1044 (1991).

40. Alan C. Swan, NAFTA and the Juridification of Economic Relations in the
Western Hemisphere, (Paper Prepared for the Colloquium Celebrating the Seventieth
Anniversary of the Institute of Air and Space Law and the Twentieth Anniversary of the
Chair for International Business Law, University of Cologne), at 33 (on file with the Uni-

versity of Miami Inter-American Law Review).
41. This discussion focuses on Chapter Eleven's impact on Mexican investment

policy. In 1993, Mexico promulgated a new law on foreign investment, the Foreign Investment Act, which replaced the 1973 law and 1989 regulations. For a discussion of the
1993 law, see Camp & Kontrimas, supra note 4. For a discussion of the prior regime, see
Gloria Sandrino, The NAFTA Investment Chapter and Foreign Direct Investment in Mexico: A Third World Perspective, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 259 (1994).
42. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1102.

1996]

HEMISPHERIC INTEGRATION

The NAFTA provisions
investor-state dispute settlement.
amount to substantial reform in each area despite stated exceptions to the general principles.
Articles 1102, 1103, and 1104 establish the treatment accorded to the investors and investments of the members of the
NAFTA as the better of national treatment or most-favorednation treatment. 43 "National treatment" is defined as "treatment no less favorable [than that accorded], in like circumstances, to [the nation's] own investors with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, opMosteration, and sale or other disposition of investments."
favored-nation treatment, or "MFN" as it is more commonly
termed, calls for treatment "no less favorable" than that given
non-NAFTA countries. Thus, the NAFTA members' investors
rank equally with investors of the host country (nationals) or
with nonmembers to whom preferential treatment is also accorded (most-favored nations), depending upon which designation is favored.
The NAFTA transfer provisions facilitate the flow of investment-related payments and proceeds by guaranteeing investors
access to foreign exchange. 45 While the "freely and without delay" language in Article 1109 infers movement without restriction, the NAFTA contains an exception to free transferability for
"serious balance of payments difficulties, or the threat thereof."46
In addition, Article 1109(4) provides that bankruptcy, securities,
criminal, and reporting laws as well as judgments can bar transfers. 47 The supranational NAFTA thus defers to national laws in

43. Id. ch. 11.
44. Id. art. 1102(1).

45. See id. art. 1109(1) ("Each Party shall permit all transfers relating to an investment of an investor of another Party in the territory of the Party to be made freely
and without delay.").
46. Id. art. 2104(1). Article 2104(2)-(5) place limitations on the exception for trans-

fers not involving trade in financial services. Id. art. 2104.
47. NAFTA, supranote 1, art. 1109(4). Article 1109(4) provides:

[A] Party may prevent a transfer through the equitable, non-discriminatory
and good faith application of its laws relating to:
(a) bankruptcy, insolvency or the protection of the rights of creditors;
(b) issuing, trading or dealing in securities;
(c) criminal or penal offenses;
(d) reports of transfers of currency or other monetary instruments; or
(e) ensuring the satisfaction of judgments in adjudicatory proceedings.

106
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traditional preserves of sovereign action to bar capital movements but frees transfers from other restrictions.
With regard to the capital market access restrictions, the
NAFTA works reform in the area of performance requirements
yet allows other barriers contained in Mexico's reservations. Article 1106 eliminates performance requirements attached to inward investment such as minimum export levels, domestic content requirements for final goods produced, and commitments to
transfer technology to the recipient country. 48 Mexico, however,
reserves the right of its Comision Nacional de Inversiones Extranjeras to review any investment in certain restricted sectors
and any acquisition of more than a forty-nine percent equity interest in existing Mexican enterprises which exceeds a threshold
amount. 49 In addition, sectoral exemptions further reduce the
free entry of investment capital.5 0 The Mexican Constitution reserves sectors of economic activity such as petroleum, electricity,
and various elements of the telecommunications industry to the
state. 51
Given Latin American nations' historical adherence to the
Calvo Doctrine, the NAFTA's provisions on expropriation and investor-state dispute settlement must be considered among its
more radical reforms.12 Article 1110 requires that the standard
for compensation for expropriation be consistent with international norms.5 3 The explicit compensation requirements entail a
refinement of the "prompt, adequate, and effective" standard. 54.
The definition of expropriation, delimited in Article 1110, Section
48. Id. ch. 11.
49. Canada also maintains a review mechanism (Investment Canada) for direct investments above a certain amount. See id. Annex I, Schedule of Canada.
50. Id. Annex III, Schedule of Mexico.
51. Id.
52. Swan, supra note 40, at 36. The Calvo Doctrine generally refers to the stance of
Latin American governments toward the settlement of disputes involving foreign investors which demands that such investors submit to the local forum and law without the
diplomatic protection of their home country. For further discussion of the Calvo Clause,
see Denise Manning-Cabrol, The Imminent Death of the Calvo Clause and the Rebirth of
the Calvo Principle Equality of Foreignand NationalInvestors, 26 GEO. L. & POL'Y INT'L
BUS. 1169 (1995); Justine Daly, Has Mexico Crossed the Border on State Responsibility
for Economic Injury to Aliens? ForeignInvestment and the Calvo Clause in Mexico After
the NAFTA, 25 ST. MARYS L.J. 1147 (1994); DONALD R. SHEA, THE CALVO CLAUSE: A
PROBLEM OF INTER-AMERICAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DIPLOMACY (1955); Lionel

Morgan Summers, The Calvo Clause, 19 VA. L. REV. 459 (1932).
53. NAFTA, supranote 1, art. 1110(5).

54. Id. art 1110.
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1, is broad and includes "measures tantamount to expropriation." a5 Under the Chapter Eleven dispute settlement provisions, the United States, Mexico, and Canada consent to arbitration for claims brought by investors.
Claims may be
submitted under the internationally recognized arbitration rules
of the International Convention for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID), the ICSID's Additional Facility Rules, or the
United Nations Centre on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)
Arbitration Rules.5 Together with the expropriation provision,
the introduction of investor-state arbitration works a departure
from the century-old Calvo Doctrine, under which investment
disputes against the state hosting the investment must be adjudicated by that state, and the Calvo Clause, a contract clause in
state contracts which binds the foreign investor to a determination under local law without intervention by the investor's home
government asserting diplomatic protection over the invest57
ment.
The NAFTA provisions for treatment, transfer, expropriation, and investor-state dispute settlement amount to a deep reform of the pre-existing Mexican regime governing foreign investment. The liberalization of transfer restrictions embodied in
Article 1109 of Chapter Eleven is repeated in the Organisation of
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements. 58 The treatment, expropriation, and investor-state arbitration provisions, however, remain
particular to the NAFTA. Whether other Western Hemisphere
nations will follow Mexico's lead and institute reform along the
55. Article 1110(1) provides: "No party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an investment of an investor of another Party in its territory or take a measure
tantamount to nationalization or expropriation of such an investment (expropriation')..
* *'

Id.

56. Id. arts. 1115-38. See Malcolm D. Rowat, MultilateralApproaches to Improving
the Investment Climate of Developing Countries: The Cases of ICSID and MIGA, 33
HARv. INT'L L.J. 103 (1992).
57. See sources and text accompanying note 52.
58. ORGANISATION OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD): CODE
OF LIBERALISATION OF CAPITAL MOVEMENTS, pt. 1, arts. 1, 2, 9; see id. Mexico's Reservations, at 9-13, 76-83. See also Pierre Poret, Mexico and the OECD Codes of Liberalization, OECD OBSERVER, Aug. 1994, at 39. Mexico became a member of the Organisation
of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and adhered to the OECD's Code of
Liberalisation of Capital Movements on May 18, 1994. As a new member of the OECD,
Mexico committed to work toward eliminating all capital controls still preserved in the
same sectoral exemptions and restrictions on inward direct investment as in Chapter
Eleven of the NAFTA.
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lines of Chapter Eleven is an issue of great significance to the
formation of the FTAA.

IV. ASSESSING THE PROSPECTS FOR SUSTAINABLE
LIBERALIZATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAWS AS A
CONCOMITANT OF HEMISPHERIC INTEGRATION IN THE
AMERICAS
While Chapter Eleven of the NAFTA might serve as the
neoliberal policy ideal for the planned FTAA, adoption of this
regime may be inconsistent with the Summit of the Americas'
pledge to pursue integration contemplative of the diversity of the
region's economies. The Declaration of Principles of the Summit
of the Americas states:
We recognize that economic integration and the creation of a
free trade area will be complex endeavors, particularly in view
of the wide differences in the levels of development and size of
economies existing in our Hemisphere. We will remain cognizant of these differences as we work toward economic integration in the Hemisphere. We look to our own resources, ingeas the international
nuity, and individual capacities as well
59
goals.
our
achieve
us
help
to
community
In the formulation of a plan for economic integration, the issue of whether an investment chapter like the NAFTA's Chapter
Eleven could be part of an FTAA agreement requires analysis of
60
the long-term feasibility of including investment in integration.
In evaluating the possibility of agreement on investment, consideration must be given to the continuing viability or "sustainability" of liberalization on the national level in light of potential
institutional weaknesses. Despite the present consensus on freemarket economic policy and openness to foreign investment evident throughout Latin America and certain countries' demonstrated adherence to liberal regimes, the reform's permanence is
not a foregone conclusion. The sustainability of reform depends
59. Summit Declaration, supra note 7.
60. Advocating the formulation of a "two-tier arrangemen' for "more efficient and
stable integration in developing countries," P. Kenneth Kiplagat suggests that "separating [trade liberalization and investment distribution] will assure that regional trade
continues while the more problematic issues of investment and distribution of benefits
are resolved." P. Kenneth Kilpagat, An Institutionaland StructuralModel for Successful
Economic Integration in Developing Countries,29 TEXAS IN'I'L L.J. 39, 63 (1994).
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on whether there is sufficient popular support to allow for a
complete transition from the policymaking characteristic of economic populism. As the most problematic aspect of liberalization
of laws governing foreign investment, breaking out of the
"populist policy cycle" may be essential for the inclusion of investment provisions in a hemispheric free trade agreement.
A.

Adherence to NeoliberalReform

Despite the optimism that accompanies discussions of the
FTAA, there are few countries with investment law regimes as
open as an unmodified extension of the NAFTA's Chapter Eleven
would require. Aside from the case of Mexico, where investment
law reform endured a severe economic crisis,6 ' the situations of
Chile and Argentina appear to stand out as examples of economies displaying strong adherence to market reform. Reform in
Chile began in 1974 as the result of historical circumstances.
Argentina's opening to foreign capital occurred contemporaneously with other countries' reforms. The two countries' experiences are set forth as examples of adherence to neoliberal reform
beyond the confines of the NAFTA.
Chile's economic stability and openness to foreign investors
is attributable in large part to its longer experience with market
reform. 62 Significant investment law liberalization began in
1974 with the tenure of a military dictator who allowed neoliberal policies "free" reign over the economy.6 3 The "Chicago
61. Labeled as the "first 'post-market revolution' financial crisis," the peso devalua-

tion crisis occurred in late 1994 when Mexico allowed the peso's exchange rate to float
freely in response to a dramatic shortfall in foreign currency reserves. Hearings on
Mexican Loan Guarantees Before the House Banking Comm., 104th Cong., lst Sess. 109
(1995) (Testimony of Robert D. Hormats, Vice Chairman, Goldman Sachs International).
In noting Mexico's adherence to NAFTA reforms, economist Jeffery Schott contrasted
Mexico's reaction to the crisis with that typical of a developing country, stating that
"[o]ne would have expected very significant trade barriers to be instituted, import quotas,
perhaps capital controls ....
" Experts Downplay Trade Impact of Mexican Financial
Crisis, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), Mar. 1, 1995, at 420. See also Sidney Weintraub, The
Depth of Economic IntegrationBetween Mexico and the United States, WASH. Q., Autumn
1995, at 173; Hon. Lawrence H. Summers, Our Mexican Challenge, 26 GEO. L. & POL'Y
INT'L BuS. 97 (1995).
62. William Glade, Privatizationand the State Sector, in UNITED STATED POLICIES
AND THE LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIES 75, 77 (Werner Baer & Donald V. Coes eds., 1990).

63. Patricia Silva, Technocrats and Politics in Chile: From the Chicago Boys to the
CIEPLAN Monks, in MONEY DOCTORS, FOREIGN DEBTS, AND ECONOMIC REFORMS IN

LATIN AMERICA FROM 1890S TO THE PRESENT 205-31 (Paul Drake ed., 1994). See also
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Boys," Chilean technocrats educated in an academic cooperation
program established between the University of Chicago and the
Universidad Cat61ica in Santiago, successfully implemented
radical free-market policies that set Chile apart from its neighbors early on. 64 Decree Law No. 600, promulgated in 1974 and
amended most recently in 1993, governs direct foreign investment.6 1 This law provides that capital repatriation may occur
one year after the capital's date of entry and establishes a foreign investment contract mechanism for setting the income and
additional remittance tax rate. 66 The Compendium of Foreign
Exchange Rules sets forth an alternative to the investment contract requiring registration of investments with the Central
Bank. 67 Furthermore, few sectoral reservations to foreign investment exist. 68 Coupled with Chile's current economic health,

a foreign investment regime aimed at attracting long-term for69
eign capital allows Chile to set its own terms of liberalization.
From the 1940s to the late 1980s, Argentina's economic polManuel Agosin, StructuralAdjustment and ForeignDirect Investment: The Case of Chile,
CEPAL: Conference Room Paper, 20 (1992) CEconomic reform in Chile in the period
1974-89 was intense and without precedent in the developing world."); Martinez supra
note 28, at 474 n.17 ("The military dictatorship of General Augusto Pinochet, whose administration repressed any social or political dissent, governed Chile during this reform.
Because of this lack of effective political opposition, the Chilean experiment proceeded
with little difficulty.').
64. Silva, supra note 63, at 205-11.
65. ROBERTO MAYORGA & LUIS MoNTT, FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CHILE 60 (1995)
(referring to Decree Law No. 600, D.O., July 13, 1974, as amended by Decree Law No.
1748, G.O., March 18, 1977 and Law 19.207, G.O., March 31, 1993).
66. Id. at 77.
67. Id. See also INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, EXCHANGE ARRANGEMENTS AND
EXCHANGE RESTRICTIONS--ANNUAL REPORT 1995, at 107 (1995). Recent Central Bank
Resolutions now subject all equity investments made under Chapter XIV of the Central
Bank's Compendium of Foreign Exchange Rules to a thirty percent deposit requirement.
The Central Bank has discretion to determine the applicability of an exemption for Chapter XIV investments "made with the purpose of [either (1)] paying in or increasing the
capital of a Chilean company, provided the latter uses the funds to expand its productive
capacity of goods and services, or [(2)] purchasing shares or rights of an existing company
with the purpose of becoming involved in its management." Jorge Carey, Foreign Investment Conditions Tightened, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Dec. 1996, at 55 (referring to Central
Bank Resolutions Nos. 554E-01-961007 and 558E-01-961023 of Oct. 23, 1996).
68. The Chilean Constitution does not reserve any sectors of the economy to the
state. Article 16 of Decree Law No. 600, however, provides restrictions for investment in
public utilities and mass communication media. MAYORGA & MONr, supra note 65 at
67, 147.
69. Jonathan Thatcher, Chile Will Only GraduallyRelax Capital Controls, Reuters,
Apr. 3, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, Txtlne File (quoting Chilean Budget
Director Jos6 Pablo Arrellano as saying that "It]his opening up has to be gradual and
We're not going to open faster [on account of NAFTA].").
prudent ....
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icy and, consequently, its foreign investment laws looked inward
as a result of Peronism.7 0 Peronism remains a force in Argentina
today although it has been tempered significantly with freemarket economic ideology and outward leanings. 7 1 Shortly after
President Carlos Menem took office in 1989, the initial step toward reform occurred when exchange controls were abolished,
ending all restrictions on access to convertible foreign currency
and allowing the repatriation of profits and capital. 72 The second
major step discernible in Argentina's reform consists of the privatization process which has been extensive in terms of both
capitalization and sectoral reach.7 3 As a third step, the 1991
convertibility plan backed all national currency with U.S. dollar
74
reserves and established an exchange rate pegged to the dollar.
Further reform came in 1993, when Decree Law No. 1.853 regulating the Foreign Investment Law was promulgated, 75 and in
70. Peter G. Snow & Gary W. Wynia, Argentina: Politics in a Conflict Society, in
LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT 128, 145 (Howard J. Wiarda & Harvey F.

Kline eds., 3d ed. 1990).
71. Carlos H. Acufia, Politics and Economics in the Argentina of the 1990s (Or, Why
the Futureis No Longer What It Used to Be), in DEMOCRACY, MARKETS, AND STRUCTURAL
REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA 31, 38-40 (William C. Smith et al. eds., 1995). For a discussion of the almost revolutionary change visited upon Argentina since Menem came to office, see Leslie Elliot Armijo, Menem's Mania?: The Timing of Privatization in Argentina,
1 Sw. J.L. & TRADE AM. 1 (1994); Edward C. Snyder, The Menem Revolution in Argentina: Progress Toward a HemisphericFree Trade Area, 29 TEX. INT'L L.J. 69 (1994). Former Minister of the Economy Domingo Cavallo was dismissed from his post in July 1996
by President Menem. For discussion of the dismissal and assessment of its consequences
for Argentina's economy, see Calvin Sims, President Ousts Finance Chief in Argentina,
N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 1996, at 39; Argentina after Cavallo, ECONOMIST, Aug. 3, 1996, at
17; Droppingthe Pilot, ECONOMIST, Aug. 3, 1996, at 37.
72. BUENOS AIRES STOCK EXCHANGE, INVESTMENT IN ARGENTINA (1995).
73. In noting the force with which Argentina's privatization drive proceeds, Canitrot stated: "Privatization is driven by an ideological credo bent on the destruction of the
core of the corporatist system that was built gradually in Argentina since the end of the
First World War." Adolfo Canitrot, Crisis and Transformation of the Argentine State
(1978-1992), in DEMOCRACY, MARKETS, AND STRUCTURAL REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA 75,
91 (William C. Smith et al. eds., 1995).
74. Ley de Desindexaci6n y Convertibilidad del Austral [Desindexation and Convertibility Law], Ley Nacional 23.928 (Apr. 1, 1991 B.O.)(Arg.). Since 1991, the Argentine currency was changed from the austral to the peso. The change in currency did not
impact the force of this law. For a discussion of this reform, see generally Anna Gelpern
& Malcolm Harrison, Ideology, Practice,and Performance in Privatization. A Case Study
of Argentina, 33 HARV. INV'L L.J. 240 (1992); DOMINGO CtSAR CURA GRASSI, CONTRATOS

EN MONEDA EXTRANJERA [FOREIGN-CURRENCY DENOMINATED CONTRACTS](1992); H9CTOR
ALEGRIA & JULIO CPSAR RIVERA, LA LEY DE CONVERTIBILIDAD [THE CONVERTIBILITY LAW]
(1991).

75. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, EXCHANGE ARRANGEMENTS AND EXCHANGE
RESTRICTIONS-ANNUAL REPORT 1995, at 19 (1995) (referring to Decree Law No. 1.853 of
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1994, when Argentina's Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) with
the U.S. came into force. 76 Both the degree of investment policy
reversal and the short time in which it occurred make Argentina
liberalized economies with regard to
one of Latin America's more
77
direct foreign investment.
The cases of Chile and Argentina demonstrate strong adherence to free-market economics and may be indicative of a larger
trend in Latin America. The commitments for treatment of U.S.
investment embodied in the U.S.-Argentina BIT parallel those of
the NAFTA. 78 The absence of performance requirements in
nearly all industries, the "more favorable of national or mostfavored-nation treatment" standard of protection, and the dis79
pute settlement provisions calling for international arbitration
place the U.S.-Argentina BIT almost on par with the NAFTA's
Chapter Eleven.8° During discussions of Chile's accession to the
NAFTA, two restrictions in the current regime, the one year
minimum stay requirement and the power exercisable by the
Foreign Investment Committee to reject investment, were noted
as inconsistent with Chapter Eleven. 8 1 Although when measured against the neoliberal standard of the NAFTA's Chapter
Eleven, both countries' foreign investment regimes are "success
stories," it is an open question whether the same can be said in
Sept. 1993).
76. Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment,
Nov. 14, 1991, U.S.-Arg., S. TREATY DOc. NO. 103-2, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993)
[hereinafter U.S.-Arg. BIT].
77. HUFBAUER & SCHOTT, supra note 3, at 21.
78. David R. Martinez, Argentina Opens Door to U.S. Investors, INT'L FIN. L. REV.,
Nov. 1994, at 45.
79. For a discussion of the U.S.-Argentina BIT's dispute settlement provisions, see
SWAN & MURPHY (Supp. 1995) supra note 2, at 98 (noting that the selection of arbitration
as the exclusive forum regardless of whether or not local remedies have been exhausted
makes this BIT "spell the total abandonment of the Calvo Doctrine").
80. Id.; U.S.-Arg. BIT, supranote 76.
81. Andrea Butelmann, Elements of Chilean Trade Strategy: The United States or
Mercosur?, in ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE 100, 113 (Roberto

Bouzas & Jaime Ros eds., 1994). During the course of negotiations for a free trade pact
between Canada and Chile in November 1996, the issue of Chile's capital controls and, in
particular, Decree Law No. 600's one year stay requirement and the recent extension of a
thirty percent deposit requirement to equity investments not qualifying for exemption
from the Central Bank's Foreign Exchange Rules were points of contention. Chile Gets
Nod on Investment Curbs in Free Trade Deal with Canada, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Nov. 1,
1996, at 1, 20. Upon the conclusion of the negotiations, Canadian Trade Minister Art
Eggleton stated that Chile would maintain certain of its capital controls but had agreed
not to "expand" its restrictions on Canadian investors. Eggleton Announces Bilateral
Free Trade Deal Between Canada,Chile, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Nov. 15, 1996, at 1, 32.
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the long term when the reforms are measured by popular sup82
port.

B. The Concern for the Sustainabilityof the Reform
The establishment of the WTO and the conclusion of international agreements on trade-related aspects of intellectual
property rights, trade in services, and trade-related investment
measures following the Uruguay Round of the GATT marked
milestones in trade policy reform, both worldwide and within the
Americas. 8 International agreement on investment, however,
lags behind agreement on trade policy. 4 In the context of planning for the FTAA, the discrepancy between investment and
trade policy reform in Latin America is a necessary consideration. Because of this discrepancy, a scheme for integration
which incorporates the liberalization of investment laws may
need to address certain institutional reforms upon which the
sustainability of the broader liberalization depends. Accordingly,
this Comment highlights some reform considerations underlying
the neoliberal "Washington Consensus" policy orientation. The
"populist policy cycle" and related issues of income inequality,
social development, and industrial policy reform warrant the attention of the architects of hemispheric integration.

1. The Neoliberal "Washington Consensus" and the
"Populist Policy Cycle"
In order to justify the concern for the sustainability of foreign investment law liberalization, an understanding of the un82. For a discussion of protest against reform in Argentina, see Calvin Sims, Hard
Times for Millions as Argentina Slims Down, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 1996, at A6 C'The

Government is facing the greatest opposition to its economic adjustment plan since the
reforms went into effect five years ago.").
83. Sam Laird, Latin American Trade Liberalization, 4 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE
195, 200 (1995) (noting that "[i]n the Uruguay Round, all Latin American contracting
parties made comprehensive binding ceiling commitments and substantial commitments
in other areas including services and intellectual property."). See also Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 12 (1994); Agreement on
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994);
General Agreement on Trade in Services, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 44 (1994).
84. C. Fred Bergstein, Globalizing Free Trade, 75 FOREIGN AFF. 105, 109 (1996)
("Investment is a second area in which the internal rules have lagged far behind commercial practice.").
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derpinnings of the broader liberalization trend proves useful.
The impetus behind the policy reforms that began in the late
85
1980s is sometimes referred to as the "Washington Consensus."
Tamara Lothian recently described the four central components
of the Washington Consensus: 1) orthodox stabilization;8 62) libSet
eralization; 3) export orientation; and 4) privatization.
thought,
economic
within the larger global current of neoliberal
the Washington Consensus represents a general economic policy
which supports the recent policy reform in Latin
orientation
87
America.
85. Tamara Lothian, The Democratized Market Economy in Latin America (and
Elsewhere): An Exercise in InstitutionalThinking Within Law and Political Economy, 28
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 169, 175 (1995); Gustav Ranis, Will Latin America Now Put a Stop to
"Stop-and-Go?," 38 J. INTER-AM. STUD. & WORLD AFF. 127, 128 (1996). An alternative
label suggested by Sebastian Edwards is the "new Latin American consensus." Edwards
also notes Enrique Iglesias' label, "trend toward convergence." See also SEBASTIAN
EDWARDS, CRISIS AND REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA: FROM DESPAIR TO HOPE 41, 48 (1995).

86. Lothian, supra note 85, at 176. Edwards cites Iglesias' alternative formulation,
the "trend toward convergence" in Latin America as consisting of the following four components: 1) macroeconomic stability; 2) trade openness; 3) poverty alleviation; and 4) a
reduced role for government." EDWARDS, supra note 85, at 48 (citing ENRIQUE IGLESIAS,
REFLECTIONS ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: TOWARD A NEW LATIN AMERICAN CONSENSUS

the fundamental pillars [ol] . . . macroeconomic
(1992)). Edwards urges "respect [oi]
stability, outward orientation, and a state that stays away from production and efficiently provides public services and social programs aimed at effectively reducing poverty
and inequality." Id. at 314.
87. In explaining the adherence to neoliberalism in Latin America, Lothian sees
what she terms the "neoliberal project" as "represent[ing] one response to the failures
and limitations of an autarchic, import-substituting industrialization and pseudokeynesianism." Lothian, supra note 85, at 175. With respect to the "Washington Consensus"
impetus, Lothian notes:
The ["Washington Consensus"] label clearly suggests the decisive nature of
the American influence upon the ascendancy of neoliberal ideas in Latin
America and elsewhere. This influence has two overlapping sources: the
world of the American technocracy, established in government and in the
major multilateral banks and, more importantly, the world of the American
universities, especially the graduate economics departments where so many
candidates for Latin American elite status have trained.
Id. at 175.
Edwards identifies alternative rationales for the shift in policy direction:
Several authors suggest that the new approach toward development policy in
Latin America was imposed from the outside, especially by the U.S. Treasury, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund, the so-called
Washington Consensus. Although these institutions obviously had a role to
play in forging the new views, they do not deserve central billing in the process. An interpretation closer to history would give a fundamental role to the
soul-searching that began in Latin America in the early 1980s. The two most
important elements within this process were the failure of the heterodox programs and the reinterpretation of the Chilean experience.
EDWARDS, supra note 85, at 55.
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The phenomenon of economic populism is likely the most
significant threat to the fruition of lasting neoliberal economic
reform in Latin America. 88 Identifying economic populism as a
"common type of policy failure in Latin America," Jeffrey
D.
Sachs refers to the "populist policy cycle" as a "type of Latin
American policy-making, characterized by overly expansionary
macroeconomic policies which lead to high inflation and severe
balance of payments crises, [which] has been repeated so often,
and with such common characteristics, that it plainly reveals the
linkages from social conflict to poor economic performance." 89 An
interpretation of the populist policy cycle as coupled with imprudent public finance is set forth by Lothian. In her view, the
"populist policy cycle" figures within the larger "typical history of
pseudokeynesian state finance." 90 She identifies the "boom-bust
cycle of economic populism" in the following terms:
Demand-led inflationary growth produces a short-lived boom
and a substantial increase in nominal wages. The boom comes
to an end with a balance-of-payments crisis brought about by

an overvalued exchange rate and an unsustainable rise in imports. Disinvestment and capital flight finish what the balance-of-payments crisis began. In the end, the government
finds itself driven to adopt an austerity program that de-

presses the real wage and the overall level of economic activity, sometimes to a point below where the cycle began. 9 1

The continuing tension between neoliberalism and economic
populism presents a substantial challenge to economic policymakers in Latin America.

88. Carlos F. Diaz-Alejandro, Southern Cone Stabilization Program, in ECONOMIC
STABILIZATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 119 (W. R. Cline & Sidney Weintraub eds.,
1981).
89. Jeffrey D. Sachs, Social Conflict and Populist Policies in Latin America, in
LABOUR RELATIONS AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 137, 139 (Renato Brunetta & Carlo

Dell'Aringa eds., 1990).
90. Lothian, supra note 85, at 174. Lothian's "pseudokeynesian" public finance adds
a "sequential aspect" to the cyclical phenomenon. The "pseudokeynesian" form of deficit
finance entails a government's use of inflationary finance to stave off recession until inflation becomes chronic and, in Lothian's view, to fund the perpetuation of retrograde
industrial policy and economic dualism through a transfer of resources to a favored private sector. Id. at 170-75. For a discussion of deficit finance in this context, see RUDIGER
DORNBUSCH, Introduction to STABILIZATION, DEBT, AND REFORM 13, 18-22 (Rudiger
Dornbusch ed., 1993).
91. Lothian, supra note 85, at 174.
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Explanations of the "populist policy cycle" emphasize the
hasty and reactionary responses by the state to mounting political pressure within an "environment of unresolved social conflict."9 2 Identification of episodes of populist policymaking in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru provides documentation of the
93
phenomenon's prevalence in Latin America. In general, it is
evident that the lack of consistently effective economic policymaking has militated against the implementation of strong doses
of market reform. The answer to whether the recent wave of liberalization will prove sustainable in the face of the historic propensity toward cycling rests with an assessment of the present
institutional capacity to manage free-market policies in the
midst of high levels of income inequality and potential social
94
conflict.

92. Sachs, supra note 89, at 147 (emphasizing that "it is the environment of unresolved social conflict that spurs this kind of populist policy cycle"). Highlighting conditions particular to the "step-and-go cycle" in the Latin American context, Gustav Ranis
notes:

[H]istorically, Latin America underwent an unusually long period of import
substitution, which culminated in a much deeper entrenchment of the government disposition to intervene than was true elsewhere in the developing
world. However, this also meant, at least in the past, that even after opening
up the economy and encouraging a la mode, the temptation to revert, in the
face of some exogenous shock, has been strong.
Ranis, supra note 85, at 137.
93. Jeffrey D. Sachs identifies nine episodes, discussing the first four at length:
1) Argentina, 1946-49, under Juan Perbn; 2) Chile, 1971-73, under Salvador Allende;
3) Brazil, 1985-88, under Jos6 Sarney; 4) Peru 1985-88, under AlAn Garcia; 5) Bolivia,
1982-85, under Hernfin Siles Zuazo; 6) Brazil, 1962-64, under Joio Goulart; 7) Chile,
1952-55, under Carlos Ib~fiez; 8) Mexico, 1979-82, under Ldpez Portillo; and 9) Nicaragua, 1980-87, under the Sandinista government. Sachs, supra note 89, at 148. Rudiger
Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards provide detailed analyses of episodes (2) Chile, 197173, under Salvador Allende and (4) Peru, 1985-88, under Alan Garcia. Rudiger Dornbusch & Sebastian Edwards, Macroeconomic Populism, in STABILIZATION, DEBT, AND

REFORM 253 (Rudiger Dornbusch ed., 1993).
94. In discussing the "[uncertainty of] the ability of regional governments to oversee
market economies," journalists quoted former Venezuelan industry minister Moises
Naim as stating that "[g]overnments in Latin America are not up to the tasks of sustaining and deepening economic reforms, overseeing newly liberalized private sectors, dealing with the problems of poverty and inequality, or consolidating democratic policies."
Stephen Fidler & George Graham, Bonds that Bind a Hemisphere:Latin America and the
US Are Agreed on the Importance of Regional Trade, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1994, at 25,
availablein LEXIS, News Library, Fintme File.
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2. Breaking Out of the Cycle: A Consideration for the
Architects of Hemispheric Integration
Addressing the prospects for permanency of the recent neoliberal reform in Latin America, Sebastian Edwards noted:
The economic history of Latin America has been compared to
Gabriel Garcia Marquez's classic novel One Hundred Years of
Solitude. Events seem to repeat themselves endlessly, following irregular and magical cycles of sorrow and frustration. The
recent reforms that engulfed the region are beginning to break
this melancholic circularity. After decades of timid performand in spite of the Mexican
ance and spiraling inequalities,
95
crisis, there are rays of hope.
Placing further emphasis on the economic reform as a
"beginning," the same economist recently elaborated upon this
theme, suggesting that a "second generation" of reform is necessary for the success of liberalization on the economic front. 96 In
explaining the failure of the earlier nineteenth-century economic
liberalism in Latin America, a historian highlights the disruptive
role of inequalities:
Given the colonial heritage of racial, social, and economic inequality, economic liberalism broke monopolies and protectionisms only to further concentrate wealth .... [T]he liberal free
market vision ... preceded the socioeconomic reality it needed
to come to fruition, subordinating liberalism to the dominant
classes' need to centralize political control and dooming its

95. EDWARDS, supra note 85, at 314. Questioning the transition, Detlev Vagts, in
1990, noted: "The present state of the world economy, and in particular the dire straits of
much of the developing world, should not cause states to go too far in making concessions. History shows an incessant cycle of changes." Detlev F. Vagts, Protecting Foreign
Direct Investment: An International Law Perspective, in FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE
1990s: A NEW CUIMATE IN THE THIRD WORLD 102, 115 (Cynthia Day Wallace ed., 1990).
But cf. Swan, supra note 40, at 41 (suggesting that "[wihile the insulation [from "certain
types of political intervention in the economy'] can never be complete, tiuridification] can
profoundly reduce the chances that any political assault on its encoded reforms will succeed").
96. SHAID JAVED BURlm & SEBASTIAN EDWARDS, DISMANTLING THE POPULIST STATE:
THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 1-4 (1996). The
"key elements" of the suggested additional reform are "disassembling the remains of the
old populist structures, the creation of new institutions and the rebuilding of the state."
Id. at 4.
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97

Whether these forms of inequality claimed to have hindered
the redistributive effect in the past have been erased to a degree
sufficient for a successful liberalization may be a worthwhile
query. 98
Critiques of orthodox neoliberal reform often point to a
"middle path" for future reform, tempering the Washington Consensus in a variety of ways. Even some of those party to the
Washington Consensus emphasize the goal of "sustainable liberalization." 99 In general, alternative versions propose either accompanying institutional reform or reregulation amounting to a
reversal or limitation of the liberalization. The substance and
form of either an accompaniment to or a modification of the progressive liberalization of investment laws, however, is a matter
of debate.
As an accompaniment to liberalization on the economic
front, supporting reform in the social and political areas could
help ensure the sustainability of market reform. As the governments of the Americas steer their economies toward greater
openness to foreign investment, economic growth is advanced as
private capital flows into key sectors and facilitates infrastructural development. While investment in sectors offering a market rate of return is forthcoming, the wherewithal of social development and institutional reform is left to the individual
governments and the international community. If economic reform is self-sustaining, the liberalization alone should lead to
social development and income redistribution. If, on the other
hand, groundwork must be laid before the market reform can
take hold, the reform's longevity may be threatened by redistributive demands.10° Under the latter scenario, the notion that
97. Mallon, supra note 11, at 184 n.54. See also Lothian, supra note 85, at 182.
98. For data on income distribution, see Joseph R. Ramos, Poverty and Inequality in
Latin America: A Neostructural Perspective, 38 J. INTER-AM. STUD. & WORLD AFF. 141

(1996) (noting that "the distribution of income in Latin America has become, if anything,
more highly skewed than ever").
99. Michel Camdessus, The IMF Way to Open Capital Accounts, WALL ST. J. , Sept.
27, 1995, at A14 ("In promoting sustainable liberalization, the IMF is promoting the only
kind of liberalization that is worthwhile.").
100. Amy L. Chua notes that:
[I]nthe developing world, there may be more than one invisible hand at
work. Rational economic self-interest is not the only, and perhaps not the
strongest, fundamental motive operating within developing societies ....
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"modern economies require modern institutions" means that institutional reform is an indispensable condition for a flourishing
open economy.' 0 1 Institutional reform aimed at "dismantling the
populist state" and complemented by investment in social development may in fact be a necessary accompaniment to market re102
form in Latin America.
Among the articulated versions for modification of the neoliberal reform through reregulation are those which urge restrictions on foreign investment on either a sectoral or compreAlongside the universalistic rationality supposed by the market, there is also
the irrationality imposed by ethnic hatreds and desperate nationalism that in
some cases have existed for hundreds of years. This is the invisible hand that
steers societies not toward cooperation and prosperity, but toward bloodshed
and ruin.
Chua, supra note 29, at 287.
101. BURKI & EDWARDS, supra note 96, at 26. Also addressing this issue, Tamara
Lothian suggests an alternative to the "Washington Consensus" more cautious of the
resilience of market reform in Latin America today:
The alternative sees the need and the opportunity to limit economic inequality as both a condition and a consequence of economic progress. To some degree, such limits are a condition (because of the dependence of sustained economic growth upon equalizing reforms such as land redistribution and
educational investment) that provides results more secure and dramatic than
anything expected from traditional welfare entitlements. At the same time,
the acceleration of economic experimentalism, defined organizationally, institutionally, culturally, and technologically, provides an opportunity to carry
further the campaign against large and rigid inequalities.
Lothian, supranote 85, at 182.
102. BURKI & EDWARDS, supra note 96, at 3. Burki and Edwards state that institutional reform is"crucial to reviewing support for the reform program." Id. at 3-4. Elaborating on the need for such reform, they note:
The traditional Latin state was subject to a paradox: It was both omnipresent
and yet extremely weak. It was weak in at least two ways: First, it was unable to accomplish its functions with a minimum level of efficiency; and second, it was "captured" by numerous interest groups that competed to extract
rents from the state. In an effort to solve these problems politicians burdened the state with additional obligations--which it could not perform-and
tried to regulate people's behavior through multiple rules. The results: inefficiency, corruption and inequity.
Id. at 23.
In particular, Burki and Edwards advocate reform of the state aimed at: 1) limiting the
state's role to areas of private sector inefficiency and ensuring that the state limits its
potential for abuses yet preserves its will to resist interest group control; 2) effectively
guaranteeing that the state can "protect broadly defined property rights, enforce contracts, and provide an efficient system of conflict-resolution;" 3) promoting better administrative functioning; 4) creating "social capital--"institutions that facilitate the interaction among individuals and between individuals and the state;" and 5) redefining the
relationships between national and subnational governments. Id. at 23-25. See also Lothian, supra note 85 (discussing institutional reform with an emphasis on industrial policy reform and social and political development).
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hensive basis. 108 Other discussions of reregulation express a
generalized concern over unrestricted capital movements in the
name of the "democratization" of development10 4 and the "equalization" of economic rights. 10 5 In the context of economic integration in the Americas, proposals for reregulation confront a
widespread ideological consensus on the merits of neoliberal reform, a demonstrated trend toward deregulation aimed at attracting foreign capital, and Summit of the Americas Declaration
pledges to reduce barriers to investment for the purpose of integration.I°6 When viewed alongside these developments, calls for
103. Enrique R. Carrasco, Law, Hierarchy, and Vulnerable Groups in Latin America:
Towards a Communal Model of Development in a Neoliberal World, 30 STAN. J. INT'L L.
221, 222 n.2 (1994) (advocating a "dynamic dependency model" entailing restrictions on
foreign investment); Chua, supra note 29, at 289, 292. Chua suggests restrictions on
ownership by foreign nationals as well as by "internal foreigners," noting:
Ownership restrictions may be relevant in addressing inwardly directed nationalism as well. In Latin America, where backlash against "internal foreigners" has assumed an anti-aristocratic form, the aims of such restrictions
would be to prevent reconcentration of ownership in the hands of "a small...
European and mixed blood" elite.
Id. (citing Tim Golden, Rebels Determined "to Build Socialism" in Mexico, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 4, 1994, at A3, for the phrase "a small... European and mixed blood' elite").
104. James C.N. Paul contemplates an expansion of the international law of development's (ILD) reach to restrict capital flows:
The ILD ... does not yet address all the dangers to large numbers of people
posed by unregulated flows of capital and industries in and out of countries,
or other risks to the human welfare that seem to attend the new global economy. The ILD does, however, stress that development should be peoplecentered, sustainable, and primarily concerned with the welfare of the poor
and powerless, and that the processes of development should be
"democratized" and sensitized to "human rights." Hopefully, these principles
provide a basis for demanding and building a more global economy by integrating the standards of the ILD into a new regime of rules governing trade,
investment, indebtedness, and other elements of the [international economic
law] IEL.
James C.N. Paul, The United Nations and the Creationof an InternationalLaw of Development, 36 HARV. INT'L L.J. 307, 310 (1995). For a discussion of the sources and content
of the international law of development, see id. For a discussion of international economic law, see LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 146-54 (1995).

105. Toward the end of distributive justice, Paul H. Brietzke advocates a reregulation of capital movements:
A creative reregulation is in order, one aiming at the maximum of equalization that can be achieved with minimal losses in efficiency, at the curbing of
rent-seeking behavior, and at eliminating the barriers that keep the poor out
of rich men's institutions. Inappropriate foreign models of companies law
should be revised, with particular attention paid to the reregulation of MNCs
and of the property and stock markets where speculation absorbs too many of
the scarce resources that could find more productive uses.
Paul H. Brietzke, Accountability in the "BraveNew World"of Development, THIRD WORLD
LEGAL STUD. 99, 123 (1992).
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reregulation or reversal of liberalization may lack the consensus
necessary for them to constitute viable options. Given the propensity of policymakers in Latin America to revert to an economic populism that may shun needed capital inflows and ultimately inhibit growth, reregulation, if linked with populist
policy-making, may only perpetuate the historical cycling. If
aimed at lessening the immediate negative social and economic
impact of liberalization and ensuring a just distribution of its
benefits, the implementation of institutional reform as an accopaniment to and in support of liberalization emerges as a more
workable route than reregulation.
As part of the "soft law" of regional integration, 10 7 the
Summit principle calling for active consideration of the differing
levels of economic development of the prospective FTAA partners1 08 supports the possible need for an accompaniment to
FTAA liberalization. To promote the considerate liberalization
called for as a concomitant of hemispheric integration, concern
for the reform's sustainability in light of the "populist policy cycle" phenomenon must figure into the integration plan. Given
the present neoliberal consensus, whether accompanying institutional reform is necessary to sustain liberalization is a point
worth considering at this juncture.
V. CONCLUSION
Regardless of the blueprint for integration in the Americas,
the issue of the residual restrictions on nonnational investment
flows will only be of increasing importance. Given the few international guidelines 0 9 that could be used in resolving the sub106. Summit Declaration, supra note 7, at 811.
107. As a non-legal commitment, the declaration made at the Summit of the Americas by the democratically elected heads of state of Western Hemisphere nations might be
classified as "soft law." Cf. LoTnS HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS § 5, at 147 (3d. ed. 1993).
108. Summit Declaration, supra note 7, at 812.
109. Although at present there is no binding international arrangement providing
positive standards for treatment of foreign direct investment, the World Bank put forth
guidelines in an effort toward developing such a legal regime through clarification of the
current patchwork of foreign investment laws. See World Bank Report to the Development Committee and Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment, Sept.
16, 1987, 31 I.L.M. 1363 (1992). See also Declaration by the Governments of OECD
Member Countries and Decisions of the OECD Council on International Investment and
Multinational Enterprises of 21 June 1976, 1 B.D.I.E.L. 563, available in LEXIS, Intlaw
Library, Bdiel File.
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stance of the foreign investment law issue, the use of the
NAFTA's Chapter Eleven may be most consistent with both the
resurgence of economic liberalism in the region and international
economic law. The consensus of the leaders meeting at the
Summit of the Americas to join together and work toward integration with regard to both trade and investment holds great
promise for regional cooperation. The past decade's reform in
Latin American legal systems with regard to the treatment of
foreign investment marks a monumental transition toward freemarket economic policies. In assessing the prospects for including foreign investment in the hemispheric free trade agreement,
the Summit Declaration's pledge to take into consideration the
large differences in development that exist within the region
must not escape notice.
Given the historic cycling of economic reform in Latin
America, permanency must be the most sought-after aspect of
liberalization plans. The global liberalization of trade and investment laws and the increased levels of direct investment of a
new character" 0 in developing countries"' may enhance the
prospects for long-term liberalization. The content of integration
arrangements, however, has great potential to influence the
stability of the reform. The staging of investment law liberalization in accordance with the Summit of the Americas' Declaration
of Principles and accompanied by institutional reform and investment in social development aimed at counteracting policymaking failures would best ensure that the sustainable liberalization of investment laws becomes a concomitant of hemispheric
integration in the Americas.
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